There has been a recent surge of interest in open source software development, which involves developers at many di¡erent locations and organizations sharing code to develop and re¢ne programs. To an economist, the behavior of individual programmers and commercial companies engaged in open source projects is initially startling. This paper makes a preliminary exploration of the economics of open source software. We highlight the extent to which labor economics, especially the literature on`career concerns', and industrial organization theory can explain many of these projects' features. We conclude by listing interesting research questions related to open source software.
. Yet to an economist, the behavior of individual programmers and commercial companies engaged in open source processes is startling. Consider these quotations by two leaders of the open source community:
The idea that the proprietary software social systemöthe system that says you are not allowed to share or change softwareöis unsocial, that it is unethical, that it is simply wrong may come as a surprise to some people. But what else can we say about a system based on dividing the public and keeping users helpless? [Stallman, 1999] The`utility function' Linux hackers is maximizing is not classically economic, but is the intangible of their own ego satisfaction and reputation among other hackers. [Parenthetical comment deleted] Voluntary cultures that work this way are actually not uncommon; one other in which I have long participated is science ¢ction fandom, which unlike hackerdom explicitly recognizes`egoboo' (the enhancement of one's reputation among other fans) [Raymond, 1999b] .
It is not initially clear how these claims relate to the traditional view of the innovative process in the economics literature. Why should thousands of top-notch programmers contribute freely to the provision of a public good? Any explanation based on altruism 1 only goes so far. While users in less developed countries undoubtedly bene¢t from access to free software, many bene¢ciaries are well-to-do individuals or Fortune 500 companies. Furthermore, altruism has not played a major role in other industries, so it would have to be explained why individuals in the software industry are more altruistic than others.
This paper seeks to make a preliminary exploration of the economics of open source software. Re£ecting the early stage of the ¢eld's develop-ment, we do not seek to develop new theoretical frameworks or to statistically analyze large samples. Rather, we focus on four`mini-cases' of particular projects: Apache, Linux, Perl, and Sendmail. 2 We seek to draw some initial conclusions about the key economic patterns that underlie the open source development of software. We ¢nd that much can be explained by reference to economic frameworks. We highlight the extent to which labor economics, in particular the literature on`career concerns', and industrial organization theory can explain many of the features of open source projects.
At the same time, we acknowledge that aspects of the future of open source development process remain somewhat di¤cult to predict with`o¡-the-shelf' economic models. In the ¢nal section of this paper, we highlight a number of puzzles that the movement poses. It is our hope that this paper will have itself an`open source' nature: that it will stimulate research by other economic researchers as well.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the relationship with the earlier literature on technological innovation and scienti¢c discovery. The open source development process is somewhat reminiscent of the type of`userdriven innovation' seen in many other industries. Among other examples, Rosenberg's [1976] studies of the machine tool industry and von Hippel 's [1988] of scienti¢c instruments have highlighted the role that sophisticated users can play in accelerating technological progress. In many instances, solutions developed by particular users for individual problems have become more general solutions for wide classes of users. Similarly, user groups have played an important role in stimulating innovation in other settings: certainly, this has been the case from the earliest days of the computer industry [e.g., Caminer, et al., 1996] .
A second strand of related literature examines the adoption of the scienti¢c institutions (`open science', in Dasgupta and David's [1994] terminology) within for-pro¢t organizations. Henderson and Cockburn [1994] and Gambardella [1995] have highlighted that the explosion of knowledge in biology and biochemistry in the 1970s triggered changes in the management of R&D in major pharmaceutical ¢rms. In particular, a number of ¢rms encouraged researchers to pursue basic research, in addition to the applied projects that typically characterized these organizations. These ¢rms that did so enjoyed substantially higher R&D productivity than their peers, apparently because the research scientists allowed them to more accurately identify promising scienti¢c developments (in other words, their`absorptive capacity' was enhanced) and because the interaction with cutting-edge research made these ¢rms more attractive to top scientists. At the same time, the encouragement of`open science' processes has not been painless. Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern [1999] highlight the extent to which encouraging employees to pursue both basic and applied research led to substantial challenges in designing incentive schemes, because of the very di¡erent outputs of each activity and means through which performance is measured. 3 But as we shall argue below, certain aspects of the open source processöespecially the extent to which contributors' work is recognized and rewardedöare quite distinct from earlier settings. This study focuses on understanding this contemporaneous phenomenon, rather than seeking to make a general evaluation of the various cooperative schemes employed over time.
ii. the nature of open source software
While media attention to the phenomenon of open source software has been recent, the basic behaviors are much older in their origins. There has long been a tradition of sharing and cooperation in software development. But in recent years, both the scale and formalization of the activity have expanded dramatically with the widespread di¡usion of the Internet. 4 In the discussion below, we will highlight three distinct eras of cooperative software development.
II(i). The First Era: Early 1960s to the Early 1980s
Many of the key aspects of the computer operating systems and the Internet were developed in academic settings such as Berkeley and MIT during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as in central corporate research facilities where researchers had a great deal of autonomy (such as Bell Labs and Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center). In these years, the sharing by programmers in di¡erent organizations of basic operating code of computer programsöthe source codeöwas commonplace. 5 3 It should be noted that these changes are far from universal. In particular, many information technology and manufacturing ¢rms appear to be moving to less of an emphasis on basic science in their research facilities (for a discussion, see Rosenbloom and Spencer [1996] ). 4 This history is of necessity highly abbreviated and we do not o¡er a complete explanation of the origins of open source software. For more detailed treatments, see Browne [1999] , DiBona, Ockman, and Stone [1999] , Gomulkiewicz [1999] , Levy [1984] , Raymond [1999a] , and Wayner [2000] . 5 Programmers write source code using languages such as Basic, C, and Java. By way of contrast, most commercial software vendors only provide users with object, or binary, code. This is the sequence of 0s and 1s that directly communicates with the computer, but which is di¤cult for programmers to interpret or modify. When the source code is made available to other ¢rms by commercial developers, it is typically licensed under very restrictive conditions. Many of the cooperative development e¡orts in the 1970s focused on the development of an operating system that could run on multiple computer platforms. The most successful examples, such as Unix and the C language used for developing Unix applications, were originally developed at AT&T's Bell Laboratories. The software was then installed across institutions, being transferred freely or for a nominal charge. Many of the sites where the software was installed made further innovations, which were in turn shared with others. The process of sharing code was greatly accelerated with the di¡usion of Usenet, a computer network begun in 1979 to link together the Unix programming community. As the number of sites grew rapidly (e.g., from 3 in 1979 to 400 in 1982), the ability of programmers in university and corporate settings to rapidly share technologies was considerably enhanced.
These cooperative software development projects were undertaken on a highly informal basis. Typically no e¡ort to delineate property rights or to restrict reuse of the software were made. This informality proved to be problematic in the early 1980s, when AT&T began enforcing its (purported) intellectual property rights related to Unix.
II(ii). The Second Era: Early 1980s to the Early 1990s
In response to these threats of litigation, the ¢rst e¡orts to formalize the ground rules behind the cooperative software development process emerged. This ushered in the second era of cooperative software development. The critical institution during this period was the Free Software Foundation, begun by Richard Stallman of the MIT Arti¢cial Intelligence Laboratory in 1983. The foundation sought to develop and disseminate a wide variety of software without cost.
One important innovation introduced by the Free Software Foundation was a formal licensing procedure that aimed to preclude the assertion of patent rights concerning cooperatively developed software (as many believed that AT&T had done in the case of Unix). In exchange for being able to modify and distribute the GNU software (as it was known), software developers had to agree to make the source code freely available (or at a nominal cost). As part of the General Public License (GPL, also known as`copylefting'), the user had to also agree not to impose licensing restrictions on others. Furthermore, all enhancements to the codeöand even code that intermingled the cooperatively developed software with that developed separatelyöhad to be licensed on the same terms. It is these contractual terms that distinguish open source software from shareware (where the binary ¢les but not the underlying source code are made freely available, possibly for a trial period only) and public-domain This project, as well as contemporaneous e¡orts, also developed a number of important organizational features. In particular, these projects employed a model where contributions from many developers were accepted (and frequently publicly disseminated or posted). The o¤cial version of the program, however, was managed or controlled by a smaller subset of individuals closely involved with the project, or in some cases, an individual leader. In some cases, the project's founder (or his designated successor) served as the leader; in others, leadership rotated between various key contributors.
II(iii). The Third Era: Early 1990s to Today
The widespread di¡usion of Internet access in the early 1990s led to a dramatic acceleration of open source activity. The volume of contributions and diversity of contributors expanded sharply, and numerous new open source projects emerged, most notably Linux (a UNIX operating system developed by Linus Torvalds in 1991). As discussed in detail below, interactions between commercial companies and the open source community also became commonplace in the 1990s.
Another innovation during this period was the proliferation of alternative approaches to licensing cooperatively developed software. During the 1980s, the GPL was the dominant licensing arrangement for cooperatively developed software. This changed considerably during the 1990s. In particular, Debian, an organization set up to disseminate Linux, developed the`Debian Free Software Guidelines' in 1995. These guidelines allowed licensees greater £exibility in using the program, including the right to bundle the cooperatively developed software with proprietary code. These provisions were adopted in early 1997 by a number of individuals involved in cooperative software development, and were subsequently known as the`Open Source De¢nition'. As the authors explained:
License Must Not Contaminate Other Software. The license must not place restrictions on other software that is distributed along with the licensed software. For example, the license must not insist that all other programs distributed on the same medium must be opensource software. Rationale: Distributors of open-source software have the right to make their own choices about their own software [Open Source Initiative, 1999] .
These new guidelines did not require open source projects to be`viral': they need not`infect' all code that was compiled with the software with the requirement that it be covered under the license agreement as well. At the same time, they also accommodated more restrictive licenses, such as the General Public License.
The past few years have seen unprecedented growth of open source software. At the same time, the movement has faced a number of challenges. We will highlight two of these here: the`forking' of projects (the development of competing variations) and the development of products for high-end users.
One [I]n every release cycle Microsoft always listens to its most ignorant customers. This is the key to dumbing down each release cycle of software for further assaulting the non personal-computing population. Linux and OS/2 developers, on the other hand, tend to listen to their smartest customers . . . The good that Microsoft does in bringing computers to non-users is outdone by the curse that they bring on experienced users [Nadeau, 1999] . 7 Two main open source projects (GNOME and KDE) are meant to remedy Linux's limitations on desktop computers (by developing mouse and windows interfaces).
8 For example, Torvalds [1999] argues that the Linux model works best with developer-type software. Ghosh [1999] views the open source process as a large repeated game process of give-and-take among developer-users (the`cooking pot' model). Certainly, the greatest di¡usion of open source projects appears to be in settings where the end users are sophisticated, such as the Apache server installed by systems administrators. In these cases, users are apparently more willing to tolerate the lack of detailed documentation or easy-tounderstand user interfaces in exchange for the cost savings and the possibility of modifying the source code themselves. In several projects, such as Sendmail, project administrators chose to abandon backward compatibility in the interests of preserving program simplicity.
9 One of the rationales for this decision was that administrators using the Sendmail system were responsive to announcements that these changes would be taking place, and rapidly upgraded their systems. In a number of commercial software projects, it has been noted, these types of rapid responses are not as common. Once again, this re£ects the greater sophistication and awareness of the users of open source software.
The debate about the ability of open source software to accommodate high-end users' needs has direct implications for the choice of license. The recent popularity of more liberal licenses and the concomitant decline of the GNU license are related to the rise in the`pragmatists' in£uence. These individuals believe that allowing proprietary code and for-pro¢t activities in segments that would otherwise be poorly served by the open-source community will provide the movement with its best chance for success.
II(iv). Who Contributes?
Computer system administrators, database administrators, computer programmers, and other computer scientists and engineers represented about 2.1 million jobs in the United States in 1998. (Unless otherwise noted, the information in this paragraph is from U.S. Department of Labor [2000] .) A large number of these workersöestimated at between ¢ve and ten percentöare either self-employed or retained on a project-by-project basis by employers. Computer-related positions are projected by the federal government to be among the fastest-growing professions in the next decade.
The distribution of contributors to open source projects appears to be quite skewed. This is highlighted by an analysis of 25 million lines of open source code, constituting 3149 distinct projects [Ghosh and Prakash, 2000] . The distribution of contributions is shown in Figure 1 . More than three-quarters of the nearly 13 thousand contributors made only one contribution; only one in twenty-¢ve had more than ¢ve contributions. Yet the top decile of contributors accounted for fully 72% of the code contributed to the open source projects, and the top two deciles for 81% (see Figure 2 ). This distribution would be even more skewed if those who simply reported errors, or`bugs', were considered: for every individual who contributes code, ¢ve will simply report errors [Valloppillil, 1998 ]. To what extent this distribution is unique to open source software is unclear: the same skewness of output is also observed among programmers employed in commercial software development facilities [e.g., see Brooks, 1975, and Cusumano, 1991] , but it is unclear whether these distributions are similar in their properties. The overall picture that we drew from our interviews and from the responses we received in reaction to the ¢rst draft of the paper is that the open source process is quite e¨litist. Important contributors are few and ascend to the`core group' status, the ultimate recognition by one's peers. The e¨litist view is also supported by Mockus, et al's [1999] study of contributions to Apache. For Apache, the (core)`developers mailing list' is considered as the key list of problems to be solved, while other lists play a smaller role. The top 15 developers contribute 83% to 91% of changes (problem reports by way of contrast o¡er a much less elitist pattern).
Some evidence consistent with the suggestion that contributions to open source projects are being driven by signaling concerns can be found in the analysis of contributors to a long-standing archive of Linux postings maintained at the University of North Carolina by Dempsey, et al. [1999] . These authors examine the su¤x of the contributors' e-mail addresses. While the location of many contributors cannot be precisely identi¢ed (for instance, contributors at`.com' entities may be located anywhere in the world), the results are nonetheless suggestive. As Figure 3 depicts, 12% of the contributors are from entities with a su¤x`.edu' (typically, U.S. educational institutions), 7% from`.orgs' (traditionally reserved from U.S. non-pro¢ts), fully 37% are from Europe (e.g., with su¤xes such as . de' and`.uk') , and 11% have other su¤xes, many of which represent other foreign countries. This suggests that many of the contributions are coming from individuals outside the major software centers.
iii. the origins of four programs Each of the four case studies was developed through the review of printed materials and interviews (as well as those posted on various web sites) and face-to-face meetings with one or more key participants in the development e¡ort. In addition, we held a number of conversations with knowledgeable observers of the open source movement. In Sections IV and V, we will frequently draw on examples from the four cases. Nonetheless, we felt it would be helpful to ¢rst provide a brief overview of the development projects.
III(i). Apache
The development of Apache began in 1994. Brian Behlendorf, then 21, had the responsibility for operating one of the ¢rst commercial Internet servers in the country, that powering Wired magazine's HotWired web site. This server, like most others in the country, was at the time running the Unix-based software written at the National Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois. (The only competitive product at the time was the server developed at the joint European particle physics research facility, CERN.) The NCSA had distributed its source code freely and had a development group actively involved in re¢ning the code in consultation with the pioneering users. As Behlendorf and other users wrote emendations, or`patches', for the NCSA server, they would post them as well to mailing lists of individuals interested in Internet technology.
Behlendorf and a number of other users, however, encountered increasing frustrations in getting the NCSA sta¡ to respond to their suggestions. (During this time, a number of the NCSA sta¡ had departed to begin Netscape, and the University was in the process of negotiating a series of licenses of its software with commercial companies.) As a result, he and six other pioneering developers decided to establish a mailing list to collect and integrate the patches to the NCSA server software. They agreed that the process would be a collegial one. While a large number of individuals would be able to suggest changes, only a smaller set would be able to actually make changes to the physical code. In August 1995, the group released Apache 0.8, which represented a substantial departure from earlier approaches. A particular area of revision was the Application some simple economics of open source 207
Program Interface (API), which allowed the development of Apache features to be very`modular'. This step enabled programmers to make contributions to particular areas without a¡ecting other aspects of the programs. At the time that Apache was introduced, there was little in the way of competitive products: in fact, the absence of a good commercial alternative was a powerful motivation for the launching of the project. A variety of commercial software vendors, most notably Microsoft and Netscape, have subsequently targeted server software. Despite this competition, Apache has retained its dominant position. The November 2000 Netcraft survey [2000] of nearly 24 million Internet domains found that Apache had a dominant position: 59.7% of the sites used this server software. The closest competitors, Microsoft's IIS and Netscape's Enterprise software, were at 20.2% and 6.7% respectively.
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In 1999, the Apache Software Foundation was established to oversee the development and di¡usion of the program. The current status of Apache, as well as the other open source projects that we focused on, is summarized in Table I .
III(ii). Linux
Linux, an amalgam of`Linus' and`Unix', was created by Linus Torvalds in 1991. Unlike the other case studies considered here, Torvalds was motivated to pursue this project by intellectual curiosity, rather than by a pressing practical need. A 21-year-old graduate student, he sought to build the`kernel'öor core elementöof a truly open source operating system. Torvalds based his system on Minix, a public domain Unix system for personal computers. After approximately six months of development, a friend allowed him to post the operating system on a university server. He began encouraging contributions in a series of postings to on-line bulletin boards, such as one that posed the question`are you without a project and just dying to cut your teeth on an [operating system] you can try to modify to your needs? ' Torvalds initially distributed Linux under a licensing agreement that restricted any payment for the program, as well as requiring that all programs distributed or used with Linux be freely available. After half a year, however, he relaxed these restrictions. The number of users grew rapidly, from about one hundred after one year to half-a-million in 1994. From the beginning, Torvalds retained clear leadership of the Linux project. He rapidly moved to writing less code and coordinating the software development project, assessing contributions and arbitrating disputes. Over time, a set of lieutenants have assumed responsibility for most of the decision-making, but Torvalds still retains authority for making the ultimate decisions. While employed at California-based semiconductor manufacturer Transmeta, Torvalds continues to devote about half his time to the Linux project.
While the origin of Linux was largely driven by intellectual curiosity on the part of Torvalds and his peers, the program has evolved into one that represents a signi¢cant competitor to Microsoft's Windows operating system. While the number of Linux users is di¤cult to determine because of the numerous channels through which the program is distributed, estimates range from 7 to 16 million users worldwide.
Re£ecting its widespread di¡usion, Linux has attracted a large share of the commercial investment in open source projects. A number of ¢rms dedicated to supporting Linux have been established: pioneers included VA Linux, founded in 1993, and Red Hat, established in 1995. These commercial ¢rms sell Linux software`packages', which are often far easier to install and operate than free versions available, provide technical support to end users and computer resellers, and sell complementary proprietary products. In addition, a number of established computer hardware and software ¢rms have made extensive investments in Linux development.
III(iii). Perl
Perl, or the Practical Extraction and Reporting Language, was created by Larry Wall in 1987. Wall, a programmer with Burroughs (a computer mainframe manufacturer now part of Unisys) had already written a number of widely adopted software programs. These included a program for reading postings on on-line newsgroups and a program that enabled users to readily update old source code with new patches.
The speci¢c genesis of Perl was the large number of repetitive system administration tasks that Wall was asked to undertake while at Burroughs. In particular, Wall was required to synchronize and generate reports on two Unix-based computers as part of a project that Burroughs was undertaking for the U.S. National Security Agency. He realized that there was a need for a program language that was somewhere between the Unix shell language and the C language (suitable for developing complex programming applications). The Perl language sought to enable programmers rapidly to undertake a wide variety of tasks, particularly relating to system administration. The program was ¢rst introduced in 1987 via the Internet. It has become widely accepted as a language for developing scripts for Apache web servers, and is incorporated in a number of other programs.
Perl is administered on a rotating basis: the ten to twenty programmers (the number £uctuates over time) who have been most actively involved in the program take turns managing di¡erent aspects of the project. Wall himself has joined the sta¡ of O'Reilly & Associates, a publisher specializing in manuals documenting open source programs. While he is no longer actively contributing to the programming, he remains active in managing the project.
As in the case of Apache, Perl's success has attracted competition from commercial developers. In particular, Sun's Java and Microsoft's ActiveX, both of which were introduced well after the di¡usion of Perl, incorporate many of the same features. Rough estimates suggest that the number of Perl users is about one million. Some observers believe (see, for instance, the conversations archived at http://www.mail-archive.com/advocacy%40perl.org) that the growth usage of Perl has largely stabilized, and that many of the new users are turning to Java. As is often the case in this sector, con¢rming these claims is exceedingly di¤cult.
Two e¡orts to establish a Perl-related foundation have foundered. For instance, the Perl Institute had been intended to ensure that less glamorous tasks, such as documentation, were undertaken, in order to enhance the long-run growth of Perl. The failure of these e¡orts, however, may have re£ected more about the speci¢cs of the individual personalities involved than the prospects of the program itself.
III(iv). Sendmail
Sendmail was originally developed in the late 1970s by Eric Allman, a graduate student in computer science at the University of California at Berkeley. As part of his responsibilities, Allman worked on a variety of software development and system administration tasks at Berkeley.
One of the major challenges that Allman faced was the incompatibility of the two major computer networks on campus. The approximately one dozen Unix-based computers had been originally connected through BerkNet', a locally developed program that provided continuous interconnection. These computers, in turn, connected to those on other campuses through telephone lines, using the UUCP protocol (Unix-toUnix Copy Protocol). Finally, the Arpanet, the direct predecessor of the Internet, was introduced on the Berkeley campus around this time. Each of the networks used a di¡erent communications protocol: for instance, each person had multiple e-mail addresses, depending on the network from which the message was sent. To cope with this problem, Allman developed in 1979 a program called`Delivermail', which provided a way to greatly some simple economics of open source 211 simplify the addressing problem. In an emendated form that allowed it to address a large number of domains, it was released two years later as Sendmail'. Sendmail was soon adopted as the standard method of routing e-mail on the Arpanet. As the network grew, however, its limitations became increasingly apparent. A variety of enhanced versions of Sendmail were released in the 1980s and early 1990s which were incompatible with each otheröin the argot of the open source community, the development of the program`forked'. In 1993, Allman, who had returned to working at Berkeley after being employed at a number of software ¢rms, undertook a wholesale rewrite of Sendmail. The development was su¤ciently successful that the incompatible versions were largely abandoned in favor of the new version. While a variety of competitive products had appeared, such as Software. 
IV(i). What Motivates Programmers?
A programmer participates in a project, whether commercial or open source, only if she derives a net bene¢t (broadly de¢ned) from engaging in the activity. The net bene¢t is equal to the immediate payo¡ (current bene¢t minus current cost) plus the delayed payo¡ (delayed bene¢t minus delayed cost).
A programmer working on an open source software development project incurs a variety of bene¢ts and costs. The programmer incurs an opportunity cost of her time. While she is working on this project, she is unable to engage in another programming activity. This opportunity cost exists at the extensive and intensive margins. First, a programmer who would work as an independent on open source projects would forgo the monetary compensation she would receive if she were working for a commercial ¢rm or a university. Second, and more to the point, for a programmer with an a¤liation with a commercial company, a university or research lab, the opportunity cost is the cost of not focusing on her primary mission. For example, the academic's research output may sag, and the student's progress towards a degree slow down; these involve delayed costs. The size of this opportunity cost of not focusing on the primary mission of course depends on the extent of monitoring by the employer and more generally, the pressure on the job.
Two immediate bene¢ts may counter this cost. First, the programmer, when ¢xing a bug or customizing an open source program, may actually improve rather than reduce her performance in the mission endowed upon her by her employer. This is particularly relevant for system administrators looking for speci¢c solutions for their company. Second, the programmer compares how enjoyable the mission set by the employer and the open source alternative are. A`cool' open source project may be more fun than a routine task.
The delayed reward covers two distinct, although hard-to-distinguish, incentives. The career concern incentive refers to future job o¡ers, shares in commercial open source-based companies, 12 or future access to the venture capital market. 13 The ego grati¢cation incentive stems from a desire for peer recognition. Probably most programmers respond to both 12 Linus Torvalds and others have been awarded shares in Linux-based companies that went public. Most certainly, these rewards were unexpected and did not a¡ect the motivation of open source programmers. If this practice becomes`institutionalized', such rewards will in the future be expected and therefore impact the motivation of open source leaders. More generally, leaders of open source movements may initially not have been motivated by ego grati¢cation and career concerns. Like Behlendorf, Wall, and Allman, the`bug ¢xing' motivation may have originally been paramount. The private bene¢ts of leadership may have grown in importance as the sector matured.
13 Success at a commercial software ¢rm is likely to be a function of many attributes. Some of these (e.g., programming talent) can be signaled through participation in open source projects. Other important attributes, however, are not readily signaled through these projects. For instance, commercial projects employing a top-down architecture require that programmers work e¡ectively in teams, while many open source projects are initiated by relatively modest pieces of code, small enough to be written by a single individual. incentives. There are some di¡erences between the two. The programmer mainly preoccupied by peer recognition may shun future monetary rewards, and may also want to signal her talent to a slightly di¡erent audience than those motivated by career concerns. From an economic perspective, however, the incentives are similar in most respects. We will group the career concern incentive and the ego grati¢cation incentive under a single heading: the signaling incentive. Economic theory [e.g., HolmstrÎm, 1999] suggests that this signaling incentive is stronger, (i) the more visible the performance to the relevant audience (peers, labor market, venture capital community), (ii) the higher the impact of e¡ort on performance, and (iii) the more informative the performance about talent.
The ¢rst condition gives rise to what economists call`strategic complementarities'. To have an`audience', programmers will want to work on software projects that will attract a large number of other programmers. This suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria. The same project may attract few programmers because programmers expect that other programmers will not be interested; or it may £ourish as programmers (rationally) have faith in the project.
The same point applies to forking in a given open source project. Open source processes are in this respect quite similar to academic research. The latter is well known to exhibit fads: see the many historical examples of simultaneous discoveries discussed by Merton [1973] . Fields are completely neglected for years, while others with apparently no superior intrinsic interest attract large numbers of researchers. Fads in academia are frowned upon for their ine¤cient impact on the allocation of research. It should not be ignored, however, that fads also have bene¢ts. A fad can create a strong signaling incentive: researchers working in a popular area may be highly motivated to produce a high-quality work, since they can be con¢dent that a large audience will examine their work. 14 Turning to the leadership more speci¢cally, it may still be a puzzle that the leader initially turns over valuable code to the community.
15 Despite the substantial status and career-concerns bene¢ts of being a leader of an 14 Dasgupta and David [1994] suggest an alternative explanation for these patterns: the need to impress less-informed patrons who are likely to be impressed by the academic's undertaking research in a`hot' area. These patterns probably are driven by academic career concerns. New ¢elds tend to be relatively more attractive to younger researchers, since older researchers have already invested in established ¢elds and therefore have lower marginal costs of continuing in these ¢elds. At the same time, younger researchers need to impress senior colleagues who will evaluate them for promotion. Thus, they need the presence of some of their seniors in the new ¢elds.
15 Section V will discuss companies' incentives to release code.
important open source project, it would seem that most should not resist the large monetary gains from taking a promising technology private. We can only conjecture as to why this is not the case. One possibility is that taking the technology private may meet layers of resistance within the leader's corporation. To the extent that the innovation was made while working in-house, the programmer must secure a license from the employer; 16 and her division, which does not want to lose a key programmer, may not be supportive of her demand. Another possibility is that the open source process may be a more credible way of harnessing energies when, say, ¢ghting against a dominant player in the industry.
IV(ii). Comparison Between Open Source and Closed Source Programming
Incentives.
To compare programmers' incentives in the open source and proprietary settings, we need to examine how the fundamental features of the two environments shape the incentives just reviewed. We will ¢rst consider the relative short-term rewards, and then turn to the deferred compensation.
Commercial projects have an edge on the current-compensation dimension because the proprietary nature of the code generates income. This makes it privately worthwhile for private companies to o¡er salaries.
17
This contention is the old argument in economics that the prospect of pro¢t encourages investment, which is used, for instance, to justify the awarding of patents to encourage invention.
By way of contrast, an open source project may well lower the cost for the programmer, for two reasons:
(i)`Alumni e¡ect': Because the code is freely available to all, it can be used in schools and universities for learning purposes; so it is already familiar to programmers. This reduces their cost of programming for UNIX, for example.
18
(ii) Customization and bug-¢xing bene¢ts: The cost of contributing to an open source project can be o¡set if the activity brings about a private 16 Open source projects may be seen as imposing less of a competitive threat to the ¢rm. As a result, the ¢rm may be less inclined to enforce its property rights on innovations turned open source. Alternatively, the ¢rm may be unaware that the open source project is progressing.
17 To be certain, commercial ¢rms (e.g., Netscape, Sun, O'Reilly, Transmeta) supporting open source projects are also able to compensate programmers, because they indirectly bene¢t ¢nancially from these projects. Similarly, the government and not-for-pro¢t corporations have done some subsidizing of open source projects. Still, there should be an edge for commercial companies.
18 While we are here interested in private incentives to participate, note that this complementarity between apprenticeship and projects is socially bene¢cial. The social bene¢ts might not increase linearly with open source market share, however, since the competing open source projects may end up competing for attention in the same common pool of students. some simple economics of open source 215 bene¢t (bug ¢xing, customization) for the programmer and her ¢rm. Note again that this factor of cost reduction is directly linked to the openness of the source code.
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Let us now turn to the delayed reward (signaling incentive) component. In this respect too, the open source process has some bene¢ts over the closed source approach. As we noted, signaling incentives are stronger, the more visible the performance and the more attributable the performance to a given individual. Signaling incentives therefore may be stronger in the open source mode for three reasons: These theoretical arguments also provide insights as to who is more likely to contribute and what tasks are best suited to open source projects. 19 To be certain, commercial companies leave Application Programming Interfaces for other people to provide add-ons, but this is still quite di¡erent from opening the source code. 20 On the relationship between empowerment and career concerns, see Ortega [2000] . In Cassiman's [1998] analysis of research corporations (for-pro¢t centers bringing together ¢rms with similar research goals), free riding by parent companies boosts the researchers' autonomy and helps attracting better talents. Cassiman argues that it is di¤cult to sustain a reputation for respecting the autonomy of researchers within ¢rms. Cassiman's analysis looks at real control, while our argument here results from the absence of formal control over the OS programmer's activity. Sophisticated users derive direct bene¢ts when they customize or ¢x a bug in open source software. 21 A second category of potential contributors consists of individuals with strong signaling incentives; these may use open source software as a port of entry. For instance, open source processes may give a talented system administrator at a small academic institution (who is also a user!) a unique opportunity to signal her talent to peers, prospective employers, and the venture capital community.
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As to the tasks that may appeal to the open source community, one would expect that tasks such as those related to the operating systems and programming languages, whose natural audience is the community of programmers, would give rise to strong signaling incentives. (For instance, the use of Perl is largely restricted to system administrators.) By way of contrast, tasks aiming at helping the much-less-sophisticated end userö e.g., design of easy-to-use interfaces, technical support, and ensuring backward compatibilityöusually provide lower signaling incentives.
IV(iii). Evidence on Individual Incentives
A considerable amount of evidence is consistent with an economic perspective.
First, user bene¢ts are key to a number of open source projects. One of 21 A standard argument in favor of open source processes is their massive parallel debugging. Typically, commercial software ¢rms can only ask users to point at problems: beta testers do not ¢x the bugs, they just report them. It is also interesting to note that many commercial companies do not discourage their employees from working on open source projects. In many cases where companies encourage such involvement, programmers use open source tools to ¢x problems. Johnson [1999] builds a model of open source production by a community of user-developers. There is one software program or module to be developed, which is a public good for the potential developers. Each of the potential developers has a private cost of working on the project and a private value of using it; both of which are private information. Johnson shows that the probability that the innovation is made need not increase with the number of developers, as free-riding is stronger when the number of potential developers increases. 22 An argument often heard in the open source community is that people participate in open source projects because programming is fun and because they want to be`part of a team'. While this argument may contain a grain of truth, it is somewhat puzzling as it stands; for example, it is not clear why programmers who are part of a commercial team could not enjoy the same intellectual challenges and the same team interaction as those engaged in open source development. (To be sure, it may be challenging for programmers to readily switch employers if their peers in the commercial entity are not congenial.) The argument may re£ect the ability of programmers to use participation in open source projects to overcome the barriers that make signaling in other ways problematic.
23 Valloppillil [1998] further argues that reaching commercial grade quality often involves unglamorous work on power management, management infrastructure, wizards, etc., that makes it unlikely to attract open source developers. Valloppillil's argument seems a fair description of past developments in open source software. Some open source proponents do not confer much predictive power on his argument, though; they predict, for example, that open source user interfaces such as GNOME and KDE will achieve commercial grade quality.
some simple economics of open source 217 the origins of the free software movement was Stallman's inability to improve a printer program because Xerox refused to release the source code. In three of the four scenarios described in Section III, the project founders were motivated by information technology problems that they had encountered in their day-to-day work. For instance, in the case of Apache, the initial set of contributors was almost entirely system administrators who were struggling with the same types of problems as Behlendorf. In each case, the initial release was`runnable and testable': it provided a potential, even if imperfect, solution to a problem that was vexing considerable numbers of data processing professionals. Second, it is clear that giving credit to authors is essential in the open source movement. This principle is included as part of the nine key requirements in the`Open Source De¢nition' [Open Source Initiative, 1999] . This point is also emphasized by Raymond [1999b] , who points out surreptitiously ¢ling someone's name o¡ a project is, in cultural context, one of the ultimate crimes'.
More generally, the reputational bene¢ts that accrue from successful contributions to open source projects appear to have real e¡ects on the developers. This is acknowledged within the open source community itself. For instance, according to Raymond [1999b] , the primary bene¢ts that accrue to successful contributors of open source projects`good reputation among one's peers, attention and cooperation from others, . . . [and] higher status [in the] . . . exchange economy'. Thus, while some of bene¢ts conferred from participation in open source projects may be less concrete in nature, there also appear be quite tangibleöif delayedörewards.
The Apache project provides a good illustration of these observations. The project makes a point of recognizing all contributors on its web site, even those who simply identify a problem without proposing a solution. Similarly, the organization highlights its most committed contributors, who have the ultimate control over the project's evolution. Moreover, it appears that many of the skilled Apache programmers have bene¢ted materially from their association with the organization. Numerous contributors have been hired into Apache development groups within companies such as IBM, become involved in process-oriented companies such as Collab.Net which seek to make open source projects more feasible (see below), or else moved into other Internet tools companies in ways that were facilitated by their expertise and relationships built up during their involvement in the open source movement. Meanwhile, many of the new contributors are already employed by corporations, and working on Apache development as part of their regular assignments.
There is also substantial evidence that open source work may be a good stepping stone for securing access to venture capital. For example, the founders of Sun, Netscape, and Red Hat had signaled their talent in the open source world. In Table II , we summarize some of the subsequent Table II commercial roles played by individuals active in the open source movement.
IV(iv). Organization and Governance
Favorable characteristics for open source production are (a) its modularity (the overall project is divided into much smaller and wellde¢ned tasks (`modules') that individuals can tackle independently from other tasks) and (b) the existence of fun challenges to pursue. 24 A successful open source project also requires a credible leader or leadership, and an organization consistent with the nature of the process. Although the leader is often at the origin a user who attempts to solve a particular program, the leader over time performs less and less programming. The leader must provide a`vision', attract other programmers, and, last but not least,`keep the project together' (prevent it from forking or being abandoned).
Initial Characteristics
The success of an open source project is dependent on the ability to break the project into distinct components. Without an ability to parcel out work in di¡erent areas to programming teams who need little contact with one another, the e¡ort is likely to be unmanageable. Some observers argue that the underlying Unix architecture lent itself well to the ability to break development tasks into distinct components. It may be that as new open source projects move beyond their Unix origins and encounter new programming challenges, the ability to break projects into distinct units will be less possible. But recent developments in computer science and programming languages (e.g., the development of object-oriented programming) have encouraged further modularization, and may facilitate future open source projects.
The initial leader must also assemble a critical mass of code to which the programming community can react. Enough work must be done to show that the project is doable and has merit. At the same time, to attract additional programmers, it may be important that the leader does not perform too much of the job on his own and leaves challenging programming problems to others. 25 Indeed, programmers will initially be reluctant to join a project unless they identify an exciting challenge. 24 Open source projects have trouble attracting people initially unless they leave fun challenges`up for grabs'. On the other hand, the more programmers an open source project attracts, the more quickly the fun activities are completed. The reason why the projects need not burn out once they grow in ranks is that the`¢xed cost' that individual programmers incur when they ¢rst contribute to the project is sunk and so the marginal cost of continuing to contribute is smaller than the initial cost of contributing. 25 For example, Valloppillil's [1998] discussion of the Mozilla release.
Another reason why programmers are easier to attract at an early stage is that, if successful, the project will keep attracting a large number of programmers in the future, making early contributions very visible. Consistent with this argument, it is interesting to note that each of the four cases described above appeared to pose challenging programming problems. 26 When the initial release of each of these open source programs was made, considerable programming problems were unresolved. The promise that the project was not near a`dead end', but rather would continue to attract ongoing participation from programmers in the years to come, appears to be an important aspect of its appeal.
In this respect, Linux is perhaps the quintessential example. The initial Linux operating system was quite minimal, on the order of a few tens of thousands of lines of code. In Torvalds' initial postings in which he sought to generate interest in Linux, he explicitly highlighted the extent to which the version would require creative programming in order to achieve full functionality. Similarly, Larry Wall attributes the much of the success of Perl to the fact that it`put the focus on the creativity of the programmer'. Because it has a very limited number of rules, the program has evolved in a variety of directions that were largely unanticipated when Wall initiated the project.
Leadership
Another important determinant of project success appears to be the nature of its leadership. In some respects, the governance structures of open source projects are quite di¡erent. In a number of instances, such as Linux, there is an undisputed leader. While certain aspects are delegated to others, a strong centralization of authority characterizes these projects. In other cases, such as Apache, a committee will resolve the disputes by voting or a consensus process.
At the same time, leaders of open source projects share some common features. Most leaders are the programmers who developed the initial code for the project (or made another important contribution early in the project's development). While many make fewer programming contributions, having moved on to broader project management tasks, the individuals that we talked to believed that the initial experience was important in establishing credibility to manage the project. The splintering of the Berkeley-derived Unix development programs has been attributed in part to the absence of a single credible leader.
But what does the leadership of an open source project do? It might appear at ¢rst sight that the unconstrained, quasi-anarchistic nature of the 26 It should be cautioned that these observations are based on a small sample of successful projects. Observing which projects succeed or fail and the reasons for these divergent outcomes in an informal setting such as this one is quite challenging. open source process leaves little scope for a leadership. This, however, is incorrect. While the leader has no`formal authority' (she is unable to instruct anyone to do anything), she has substantial`real authority' in successful open source projects. 27 That is, her`recommendations', broadly viewed, tend to be followed by the vast majority of programmers working on the project. These recommendations include the initial`vision' (agenda for work, milestones), the subsequent updating of goals as the project evolves, the appointment of key leaders, the cajoling of programmers so as to avoid attrition or forking, and the overall assessment of what has been and should be achieved. (Even though participants are free to take the project where they want as long as they release the modi¢ed code, acceptance by the leadership of a modi¢cation or addition provides some certi¢cation as to its quality and its integration/compatibility with the overall project. The certi¢cation of quality is quite crucial to the open source project because the absence of liability raises concerns among users that are stronger than for commercial software, for which the vendor is liable).
The key to a successful leadership is the programmers' trust in the leadership: that is, they must believe that the leader's objectives are su¤ciently congruent with theirs and not polluted by ego-driven, commercial, or political biases. In the end, the leader's recommendations are only meant to convey her information to the community of participants. The recommendations receive support from the community only if they are likely to bene¢t the programmers, that is only if the leadership's goals are believed to be aligned with the programmers' interests.
For instance, the leadership must be willing to accept meritorious improvements, even though they do not ¢t within the leader's original blueprint. Trust in the leadership is also key to the prevention of forking. While there are natural forces against forking (the loss of economies of scale due to the creation of smaller communities, the hesitations of programmers in complementary segments to port to multiple versions, and the stigma attached to the existence of a con£ict), other factors may encourage forking. User-developers may have con£icting interests as to the evolution of the technology. Ego (signaling) concerns may also prevent a faction from admitting that another approach is more promising, or simply from accepting that it may socially be preferable to have one group join the other's e¡orts even if no clear winner has emerged. The presence of a charismatic (i.e., trusted) leader is likely to substantially reduce the probability of forking in two ways. First, indecisive programmers are likely to rally behind the leadership's preferred alternative. Second, the dissenting faction may not have an obvious leader of its own.
A good leadership should also clearly communicate its goals and evaluation procedures. Indeed, the open source organizations go to considerable e¡orts to make the nature of their decision making process transparent: the process by which the operating committee reviews new software proposals is frequently posted and all postings archived. For instance, on the Apache web site, it is explained how proposed changes to the program are reviewed by the program's governing body, whose membership is largely based on contributions to the project. (Any signi¢cant change requires at least threè yes' votesöand no vetoesöby these key decision-makers.) 
V(i). Why Don't Corporations Duplicate the Open Source Incentives?
As we already noted, owners of proprietary code are not able to enjoy the bene¢ts of getting free programmer training in schools and universities (the alumni e¡ect); nor can they easily allow users to modify their code and customize it without jeopardizing intellectual property rights. Similarly, and for the reasons developed in Section IV, commercial companies will never be able to fully duplicate the visibility of performance reached in the open source world. At most can they duplicate to some extent some of the signaling incentives of the open source world. Indeed, a number of commercial software companies (e.g., video game companies, Qualcomm for the Eudora email program) list people who have developed the software. It is an interesting question why others do not. To be certain, commercial companies do not like their key employees to become highly visible, lest they be hired away by competitors.
28 But, to a large extent, ¢rms also realize that this very visibility enables them to attract talented individuals and provides a powerful incentive to existing employees. 29 28 For instance, concerns about the`poaching' of key employees was one of the reasons cited for Steve Jobs' recent decision to cease giving credit to key programmers in Apple products [Claymon, 1999] . 29 For the economic analysis of employee visibility, see Gibbons [1997] and Gibbons and Waldman's [1999] review essays. Ronde [1999] models the ¢rms' incentives to`hide' their workers from the competition in order to preserve their trade secrets.
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To be certain, team leaders in commercial software build reputations and get identi¢ed with proprietary software just as they can on open source projects; but the ability of reputations to spread beyond the leaders is more limited, due to the non-veri¢ability of claims about who did what. 30 Another area in which software companies might try to emulate open source development is the promotion of widespread code sharing within the company. This may enable them to reduce code duplication and to broaden a programmer's audience. Interestingly, existing organizational forms may preclude the adoption of open source systems within commercial software ¢rms. An internal Microsoft document on open source [Valloppillil, 1998 ] describes a number of pressures that limit the implementation of features of open source development within Microsoft. Most importantly, each software development group appears to be largely autonomous. Software routines developed by one group are not shared with others. In some instances, the groups seek to prevent being broken up by not documenting a large number of program features. These organizational attributes, the document suggests, lead to very complex and interdependent programs that do not lend themselves to development in a`compartmentalized' manner nor to widespread sharing of source code. 
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Living symbiotically o¡ an open source project One such strategy is straightforward. It consists of commercially providing complementary services and products that are not supplied e¤ciently by 30 Commercial vendors try to address this problem in various ways. For example, Microsoft developers now have the right to present their work to their users. Promotions tò distinguished engineer' or to a higher rank more generally as well as the granting of stock options as a recognition of contributions also make the individual performance more visible to the outside world.
31 Cusamano and Selby (1995) , however, document a number of management institutions at Microsoft that attempt to limit these pressures. 34 Red Hat will make more money on support if Linux is successful. Similarly, if logic semiconductors and operating systems for personal computers are complements, one can show by a revealed preference argument that Intel's pro¢ts will increase if Linux (which unlike Windows is free) takes over the PC operating system market. Sun may bene¢t if Microsoft's position is weakened; Oracle may wish to port its database products to a Linux environment in order to lessen its dependence on Sun's Solaris operating system; and so forth. Because ¢rms do not capture all the bene¢ts of the investments, however, the free-rider problem often discussed in the economics of innovation should apply here as well. Subsidies by commercial companies for open source projects should remain limited unless the potential bene¢ciaries succeed in organizing a consortium (which will limit the free-riding problem). 35 This is similar to the strategy of giving away the razor (the released code) to sell more razor blades (the related consulting services that HP will provide).
Code Release
When can it be advantageous for a commercial company to release proprietary code under an open source license? The ¢rst condition is, as we have noted, that the company expects to thereby boost its pro¢t on a complementary segment. A second is that the increase in pro¢t in the proprietary complementary segment o¡sets any pro¢t that would have been made in the primary segment, had it not been converted to open source. Thus, the temptation to go open source is particularly strong when 33 Red Hat provides support for Linux-based products, while VA Linux provides hardware products optimized for the Linux environment. In December 1999, their market capitalizations were $17 and $10 billion respectively, though they have subsequently declined signi¢cantly. 34 Of course, these programmers also increase the company's ability to learn from scienti¢c and technical discoveries elsewhere and help the company with the development of the proprietary segment. the company is too small to compete commercially in the primary segment or when it is lagging behind the leader and about to become extinct in that segment.
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Various e¡orts by corporations selling proprietary software products to develop additional products through an open source approach have been undertaken. One of the most visible of these e¡orts was Netscape's 1998 decision to make`Mozilla', a portion of its browser source code, freely available. This e¡ort encountered severe di¤culties in its ¢rst year, only receiving approximately two dozen postings by outside developers. Much of the problems appeared to stem from the insu¤ciently modular nature of the software: re£ecting its origins as a proprietary commercial product, the di¡erent portions of the program were highly interdependent and interwoven. Netscape eventually realized it needed to undertake a major restructuring of the program, in order to enhance the ability of open source programmers to contribute to individual sections. It is also likely that Netscape raised some suspicions by not initially adopting the right governance structure. Leadership by a commercial entity may not internalize enough of the objectives of the open source community. In particular, a corporation may not be able to credibly commit to keeping all source code in the public domain and to adequately highlighting important contributions.
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For instance, in the Mozilla project, Netscape's unwillingness to make large amounts of browser code public was seen as an indication of its questionable commitment to the open source process. In addition, Netscape's initial insistence on the licensing terms that allowed the corporation to relicense the software developed in the open source project on a proprietary basis was viewed as problematic [Hamerly, Paquin and Walton, 1999] . (The argument is here the mirror image of the standard argument in industrial economics that a ¢rm may want to license its technology to several licensees in order to commit not to expropriate producers of complementary goods and services in the future: see Shepard 36 See, for example, the discussion of SGI's open source strategy in Taschek [1999] . 37 It should also be noted that many small developers are uncomfortable doing business with leading software ¢rms, feeling them to be exploitative, and that these barriers may be overcome by the adoption of open source practices by the large ¢rms. A rationalization of this story is that, along the lines of Farrell and Katz [2000] , the commercial platform owner has an incentive to introduce substitutes in a complementary segment, in order to force prices down in that segment and to raise the demand for licenses to the software platform. When, however, the platform is available through (say) a BSD-style license, the platform owner has no such incentives, as he cannot raise the platform's price. Vertical relationships between small and large ¢rms in the software industry are not fully understood, and would reward further study. 38 An interesting question is why corporations do not replicate the modular structure of open source software in commercial products more generally. One possibility may be that modular code, whatever its virtues for a team of programmers working independently, is not necessarily better for a team of programmers and managers working together.
[1987] and Farrell and Gallini [1988] .) Netscape initially proposed thè Netscape Public License', a cousin to the BSD license that allowed Netscape to take pieces of the open source code and turn them back into a proprietary project again. The licensing terms, however, may not have been the hindering factor, since the terms of the ¢nal license are even stricter than those of the GPL. Under this new license (the`Mozilla Public License'), Netscape cannot relicense the modi¢cations to the code. Dessein [1999] . Dessein shows that a principal with formal control rights over an agent's activity in general gains by delegating his control rights to an intermediary with preferences or incentives that are intermediate between his and the agent's. The partial alignment of the intermediary's preferences with the agent's fosters trust and boosts the agent's initiative, ultimately o¡setting the partial loss of control for the principal. In the case of Collab.Net, the congruence with the open source developers is obtained through the employment of visible open source developers (for example, the president and chief technical o¤cer is Brian Behlendorf, one of the cofounders of the Apache project) and the involvement of O'Reilly, a technical book publisher with strong ties to the open source community.
Intermediaries

vi. four open economic questions about open source
There are many other issues posed by open source development that require further thought. This section will highlight a number of these as suggestions for future work. 39 Some of the E-speak code remains proprietary to Hewlett Packard; so will some applications and utilities developed in the future. It should also be noted that HP can pro¢t by providing services to E-speak users, which, while not proprietary, should be an arena in which HP has a natural advantage. . Role of applications and related programs. Open source projects di¡er in the functionalities they o¡er and in the number of add-ons that are required to make them attractive. As the open source movement comes to maturity, it will confront some of the same problems as commercial software does, namely the synchronization of upgrades and the e¤cient level of backward compatibility. A user who upgrades a program (which is very cheap in the open source case) will want either the new program to be backward compatible or applications to have themselves been upgraded to the new version. 40 We know from commercial software that both approaches to compatibility are costly; for example, Windows programmers devote a lot of time to backward compatibility issues, and encouraging application development requires ¢xing applications programming interfaces about three years before the commercial release of the operating system. A reasonable conjecture could be that open source programming would be appropriate when there are fewer applications or when IT professionals can easily adjust the code so as to ensure compatibility themselves. . In£uence of competitive environment. Based on very casual observation, it seems that open source projects sometimes gain momentum when facing a battle against a dominant ¢rm, although our examples show open source projects can do well even in the absence of competition. 41 To understand why this might be the case (assuming this is an empirical fact, which remains to be established!), it would be useful to go back to the economics of cooperative joint ventures. The latter are known to work better when the members have similar objectives. 42 The existence of a dominant competitor in this respect tends to align the goals of the members, and the 40 The former solution may be particularly desirable if the user has customized last generation's applications. 41 Wayner [2000] argues that the open source movement is not about battling Microsoft or other leviathans and notes that in the early days of computing (say, until the late seventies) code sharing was the only way to go as`the computers were new, complicated, and temperamental. Cooperation was the only way that anyone could accomplish anything'. This argument is consistent with the hypothesis stated below, according to which the key factor behind cooperation is the alignment of objectives and this alignment may come from the need to get a new technology of the ground, from the presence of a dominant ¢rm, or from other causes. 42 See, e.g., Hansmann [1996] . best way to ¢ght an uphill battle against the dominant player is to remain united. To be certain, open source software development works di¡erently from joint venture production, but it also relies on cooperation within a heterogeneous group; the analogy is well worth pursuing. . Project lifespan. One of the arguments o¡ered by open source advocates is that because their source code is publicly available, and at least some contributions will continue to be made, its software will have a longer duration. (Many software products by commercial vendors are abandoned or no longer upgraded after the developer is acquired or liquidated, or even when the company develops a new product to replace the old program.) But another argument is that the nature of incentives being o¡ered open source developersöwhich as discussed above, lead them to work on highly visible projectsömight lead to a`too early' abandonment of projects that experience a relative loss in popularity. An example is the XEmacs project, an open source project to create a graphical environment with multiple`windows' that originated at Stanford. Once this development e¡ort encountered an initial decline in popularity, many of the open source developers appeared to move onto alternative projects.
VI(ii). Optimal Licensing
Our discussion of open source licensing has been unsatisfactory. Some licenses (e.g., BSD and its close cousin the Apache license) are relatively permissive, while others (e.g., GPL) force the user to distribute any changes or improvements (share them) if they distribute the software at all. Little is known about the trade-o¡ between encouraging add-ons that would not be properly supplied by the open source movement and preventing commercial vendors (including open source participants) from free riding on the movement or even`hijacking it'. An open source project may be`hijacked' by a participant who builds a valuable module and then o¡ers proprietary APIs to which application developers start writing. The innovator has then built a platform that appropriates some of the bene¢ts of the project. To be certain, open source participants might then be outraged, but it is unclear whether this would su¤ce to prevent the hijacking. The open source community would then be as powerless as the commercial owner of a platform above which a`middleware' producer superimposes a new platform.
43 43 The increasing number of software patents being granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¤ce provide another avenue through which such a`hijacking' might occur. In a number of cases, industry observers have alleged that patent examinersönot being very familiar with the unpatented`prior art' of earlier software codeöhave granted unreasonably broad patents, in some cases giving the applicant rights to software that was originally developed through open source processes.
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The exact meaning of the`viral' provisions in the GPL license, say, or more generally the implications of open source licenses have not yet been tested in court. Several issues may arise in such litigation: for instance, who has standing for representing the project if the community is fragmented, and how a remedy would be implemented (e.g., the awarding of damages for breach of copyright agreement may require incorporating the bene¢ciaries). The coexistence of commercial activities may alter the programmers' incentives. Programmers working on an open source project may be tempted to stop interacting and contributing freely if they think they have an idea for a module that might yield a huge commercial payo¡. Too many programmers may start focusing on the commercial side, making the open source process less exciting. Although they refer to a di¡erent environment, the concerns that arise about academics' involvement in start-up ¢rms, consulting projects, and patenting may be relevant here as well. While it is too early to tell, some of these same issues may appear in the open source world. other industry has yet produced anything quite like open source development. An important research question is whether other industries ever will.
VI(iii). Coexistence of Commercial and Open Source Software
Although some aspects of open source software collaboration (such as electronic information exchange across the world) could easily be duplicated, other aspects would be harder to emulate. Consider, for example, the case of biotechnology. It may be impossible to break up large projects into small manageable and independent modules and there may not be su¤cient sophisticated users who can customize the molecules to their own needs. The tasks that are involved in making the product available to the end user involve much more than consumer support and even friendlier user interfaces. Finally, the costs of designing, testing, and seeking regulatory approval for a new drug are enormous.
More generally, in many industries the development of individual components require large team work and substantial capital costs, as opposed to (for some software programs) individual contributions and no capital investment (besides the computer the programmer already has). Another obstacle is that in mass-market industries users are numerous and rather unsophisticated, and so deliver few services of peer recognition and ego grati¢cation. This suggests that the open source model may not easily be transposed to other industries, but further investigation is warranted.
Our ability to answer con¢dently these and related questions is likely to increase as the open source movement itself grows and evolves. At the same time, it is heartening to us how much of open source activities can be understood within existing economic frameworks, despite the presence of claims to the contrary. The literatures on`career concerns' and on competitive strategies provide lenses through which the structure of open source projects, the role of contributors, and the movement's ongoing evolution can be viewed.
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